Pit stops that are too quick and therefore dangerous?

During the 2012 German Grand Prix, Martin Whitmarsh, director of the McLaren team, boasted about the speed record for a wheel change set by his team: « Jenson’s second stop was the fastest pit stop in Formula 1 history, with an effective stop time of 2″31. It’s quite incredible and not only is it a testament to our confidence in our procedures and the equipment we’ve put in place to improve our performance but also to the commitment and determination of the guys on the ground to improve and perfect their technique.

Aware of the strategic importance of pit stops at a time when cars can pass through the skilled hands of wheel changers three or four times, teams have doubled their efforts during the offseason, both by developing new systems and by practicing intensively to acquire the right reflexes to save as much time as possible. This was the case for the Red Bull team, which was one of the most active in the pits during winter testing, an “investment” that seems to have paid off in Malaysia as the Austrian team claims to have broken McLaren’s record five times from last year.

Indeed, during Sebastian Vettel’s first stop, the Milton Keynes team reportedly took 2″13 to change the four tires on the triple world champion’s car. However, it was on the number two RB9, entrusted to Mark Webber, that Red Bull allegedly set a new record at 2″05. McLaren and Mercedes were not far behind, as according to the German magazine *Auto Motor und Sport*, the Woking team broke their own record with a 2″28 stop, while Mercedes changed the tires on Nico Rosberg’s F1 W04 in 2″29. “It is possible that at some point this season we will break the two-second barrier,” estimates Red Bull through a press release.

This performance in itself would not be unimaginable as Ferrari claims its mechanics have already simulated tire changes, car at a standstill, in 1″9. However, this pursuit of performance in the pits does raise potential safety concerns. In 2012, McLaren embodied this paradox — which, to be honest, isn’t one — by being the fastest in the pits but also the clumsiest. At Sepang, incidents in the pits were as frequent as speed records. At McLaren, Jenson Button was forced to stop a few dozen meters after leaving his spot, released hastily while one of his mechanics struggled with a stubborn wheel nut. At Force India, Paul di Resta and Adrian Sutil were both forced to retire for safety reasons after their pit stops turned disastrous. For Toro Rosso, the eagerness of the lollipop man could have been fatal to the races of Jean-Eric Vergne and Charles Pic, who was hit by his compatriot as he prepared to make his stop.

If these incidents fortunately had no consequences other than sporting ones, everyone will remember that in Formula 1, the pit lane remains the most dangerous place. For instance, during the 2010 Hungarian Grand Prix, a Williams mechanic was injured by a loose wheel that had escaped from Nico Rosberg’s Mercedes.

From then on, for safety reasons, the FIA might be tempted to intervene to limit the pursuit of performance in the pits, either by setting a minimum pit stop time to be observed, standardizing the procedures and tools used during stops, or more simply, by reducing the number of people allowed around the car. Indeed, today there are three mechanics per wheel during a stop, a number that could be reduced to two or even just one mechanic per wheel, as in IndyCar races or other championships.

If such a measure would not in any case prevent teams from seeking to achieve optimal performance in tire changes, it would nevertheless limit the personnel exposed in the pit lane while contributing to the reduction of costs in the discipline. It would also enhance the strategic dimension of pit stops by lengthening their duration, even though the FIA had considered, in 2012, the possibility of reducing the pit lane speed limit to 60km/h, including during qualifying and the race, to improve safety and reinforce the strategic importance of the stops.

A potential reform does not yet seem to be on the agenda, however, and as is often the case, it may take waiting for the worst to happen for the highest authorities to take action.