Jules Bianchi “did not slow down enough” according to the panel of experts

The investigation commission on Jules Bianchi’s accident at Suzuka during the Japanese Grand Prix on October 5th has delivered its findings and recommendations today.

A review of all the elements collected following the accident of the Marussia driver was conducted by a panel of experts who are members of this commission, established by the International Automobile Federation (FIA).

The commission has thus produced a 396-page report on their analysis with recommendations on possible improvements, in F1 and in all other motorsports. This report was presented to the FIA World Motor Sport Council, which was held today in Doha, Qatar.

The conclusions of the commission on the accident

« The examination of the events leading to Bianchi’s accident indicates that a number of key issues have emerged, which may have contributed to the accident, even if none taken alone caused the accident:

1. The semi-dry trajectory at turn 7 was suddenly narrowed by water flowing onto the track and down. Sutil, and Bianchi a lap later, lost control at this spot of turn 7.

2. Sutil’s car was being removed by a lifting vehicle when Bianchi arrived in Sectors 7 and 8, which includes the part of Turn 7 where the removal was taking place. Sectors 7 and 8 were under double yellow flags.

3. Bianchi did not slow down enough to avoid losing control at the same spot on the track as Sutil.

4. If the drivers comply with the requirements of double yellow flags, as defined in Appendix H, Article 2.4.5.1.b, then no competitor or official should be put in physical or immediate danger.

5. The actions taken following Sutil’s accident were in accordance with the regulations, and their interpretation followed 384 incidents over the previous 8 years. Without the benefit of hindsight, there is no apparent reason why the safety car should have been deployed either before or after Sutil’s accident.

6. Bianchi over-controlled his car suffering from oversteer, and thus left the track earlier than Sutil, heading towards an “upstream” point along the railing. Unfortunately, the recovery vehicle was in front of that portion of the railing, and he hit and went under the rear of the vehicle at high speed.

7. During the two seconds when Bianchi’s car left the track and crossed the run-off area, he pressed both the accelerator and the brake, using both feet. The FailSafe algorithm is designed to override the accelerator pedal and cut the engine, but this was inhibited by the Torque Coordinator, which controls the rear Brake by Wire (BBW) system. Bianchi’s Marussia had a unique BBW design, which proved to be incompatible with the FailSafe settings.

8. The fact that the FailSafe did not disconnect the engine torque as requested by the driver may have influenced the severity of the impact; it has not been possible to quantify this reliably. However, Bianchi may have been distracted by what was happening and the fact that his front wheels locked, and he may not have been able to steer the car to avoid the recovery vehicle.

Bianchi’s helmet hit the descending part on the side of the lifting vehicle. The magnitude and nature of the impact caused significant deceleration of the head and angular acceleration, leading to his serious injuries.

10. All rescue and medical procedures were followed, and their implementation is considered to have significantly contributed to saving Bianchi’s life.

11. It was not possible to mitigate the injuries sustained by Bianchi either by closing the driver’s cockpit or by adding a protective skirt to the recovery vehicle. Neither of these approaches is practical due to the large forces involved in a crash between a 700 kg car hitting a 6,500 kg recovery vehicle at a speed of 126 km/h. There are simply not enough impact structures on an F1 car to absorb the energy of such an impact without either destroying the driver’s survival cell or generating decelerations that cannot be survived.

It is considered fundamentally wrong to try to survive an impact between a race car and a large, heavy vehicle. It is imperative to avoid the impact of a car with a forklift and/or the marshals working nearby.

The recommendations of the commission to improve security

« A number of recommendations for improvements have been proposed, relevant in many cases to all motorsports. They are listed below:

1. A new regulation for double-yellow flags

Proposal for a new Annex H, article (potentially linked to 2.4.5.1 b):

The Race Director will impose a speed limit for each section of the track where double yellow flags are deployed.

It is proposed that a Working Group composed of FIA Race Directors and Stewards should meet and develop detailed regulations and guidelines for the implementation of this new regulation, in time to apply it in 2015 in all motor races.

2. Safety-critical software

A review of the safety-critical software and measures to verify its integrity will be implemented.

3. Circuit drainage

Guidelines concerning the drainage of the circuit will be studied, to include the drainage of access roads outside the circuit.

4. 4-hour rule

Article 5.3 of the F1 sporting regulations states that:

If the race needs to be suspended (see Article 41), the length of the suspension will be added to this period until a total race duration of four hours is reached.

It has been proposed that a rule or guideline be established so that the start time of an event is not four hours before either dusk or twilight, with the exception of night races.

It is also recommended that the F1 calendar be revised to avoid, when possible, races taking place during local rainy seasons.

5. Super License

It is proposed that drivers who obtain the Super License for the first time must take a course to familiarize themselves with all the procedures used by a running F1 and ensuring the safety of the event.

It is also proposed that new license holders take an exam to ensure they are familiar with the associated regulations.

6. Risk Assessment in F1

The consideration of a risk assessment in F1 will be conducted to ensure that there are no significant gaps in safety defenses, such that an unprecedented combination of circumstances could lead to a serious accident.

7. Tires

This is part of the challenge for a racing driver to drive their car as quickly as possible, taking into account track conditions and the characteristics of their tires. Even though the characteristics of the rain tire supplied by Pirelli did not significantly influence Bianchi’s accident or its outcome, it is recommended that arrangements be made to allow the tire supplier to adequately develop and test rain tires between each F1 season to provide the latest developments for the first race.

Reminder, the Inquiry Commission was chaired by Peter Wright, Chairman of the Security Commission, and consisted of the following members:

• Ross Brawn, former F1 team principal
• Stefano Domenicali, former F1 team principal
• Gerd Ennser, representative of the Stewards
• Emerson Fittipaldi, President of the F1 Drivers’ Commission
• Eduardo de Freitas, Race Director of the World Endurance Championship
• Roger Perat, President of the Circuits Commission
• Antonio Rigozzi, Lawyer and Judge at the FIA International Court of Appeal, chosen by the teams
• Gérard Saillant, President of the FIA Institute and the Medical Commission
• Alexander Wurz, President of the GPDA, drivers’ representative